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Abstract
Organizations have become increasingly concerned with developing and protecting their
information security systems. Despite attempts to secure the information infrastructure,
employees inside of organizations remain the largest source of threat to information cybersecurity. While previous research has focused on behavioral and situational factors that influence
cyber-security behaviors, the measurement of cyber behaviors and their relationship to other
performance variables is poorly understood. The purpose of the present study is to 1) determine
the underlying factor structure of a cyber-security behavior scale, 2) assess if individual
personality traits predict four types of cyber-security behaviors: security assurance, security
compliance, security risk, and security damaging behaviors, and 3) explore the relationship
between citizenship and counterproductive work behaviors and cyber-security behaviors. Results
indicate that cyber-security behavior can be separated into four distinct dimensions and that
personality traits such as conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience are
predictive of these behaviors. Additionally, positive cyber behaviors are related organizational
citizenship behaviors, and potentially harmful cyber behaviors related to counterproductive work
behaviors. This research has implications for using personality to predict cyber-security
behaviors and reduce insider threat in the workplace.
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Chapter One
Introduction
In an increasingly digital age, organizations continue to acquire more digital assets and
move their information and communications to online networks. With this shift in information
location comes a new kind of threat: cyber-security. Instead of a concern for information loss
through the theft of physical files, organizations face the potential loss of information and assets
via the cyber world, be it through internal or external sources. In the face of evolving technology
and imminent threats to information, organizations find it increasingly difficult predict the types
of risks they may face (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Organizations
implement security systems through various technologies to ensure that their information is
protected against attackers and other organizations, however even the most intensive security
measures can be compromised if the organization’s employees are behaving in such a way that
poses risks to information cyber-security.
Past research shows that internally-based threats (i.e. employees, insiders) are at present
the largest threat to an organization’s information (e.g. Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Stanton
et al., 2005; Van Kessel, 2008; Warkentin & Willison, 2009), and employee actions make up the
primary reason for losses of company information (CSI computer crime and security survey, as
cited in Hu et al., 2012). In fact, 59% of past employees have admitted to stealing confidential
information from their organization (Symantec & Ponemon, 2009). In the current study, the term
“employee” refers to both end users and information technology employees. End users view an
organization’s information systems as a mechanism to perform work-related responsibilities,

1

while IT employees are responsible for overseeing those systems. Both groups are included
because both have the potential to help or harm the organization via the information security
systems. Organizational cyber-security infrastructure must not only ensure the stability of a
company’s hardware and software protection, but also strive to create a workforce that promotes
positive cyber-security habits and prohibits behaviors that could put an organization at risk in the
cyber realm.
Consequently, employees’ cyber-security behaviors have recently drawn much attention
from scholars, and as such, behaviors have direct implications for security in organizations. Past
research suggests that many factors such as: organizational norms, security awareness,
motivation, leadership, and organizational culture; affect an employee’s propensity to engage in
actions that could either protect an organization’s digital information or put it at risk (Guo et al.,
2011; Guo et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2012; Padayachee, 2012). As an alternative to demonstrating
factors that influence these current employee cyber-security behaviors, organizations with
special concerns for protecting their digital information may be able to proactively select
employees who will engage in behaviors to protect the organization’s digital assets. Using
personality to identify these individuals is one option for organizations, and has not been
explored fully in previous research, though it may prove an important avenue in the cybersecurity realm. This research seeks to fill that gap, and open a new line of research into the
selection of “cyber-security champions.” Additionally, it remains unclear if cyber behaviors are
merely forms of citizenship and counterproductive work behaviors, or if they are distinct work
behaviors that should be studied as such. This thesis seeks to understand the factor structure
underlying cyber-security behaviors, identify personality characteristics that are associated with
these behaviors, and explore the relationship between these behaviors and organizational
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citizenship and counterproductive work behaviors. The primary purposes of this study are to 1)
analyze the underlying factor structure of a new cyber-security scale, 2) investigate the
relationships between cyber-security behaviors, personality, organizational citizenship behaviors,
and counterproductive work behaviors.
Defining Cyber-Security Behaviors
Scholars have noted that there is much disagreement about how cyber-security behaviors
are best conceptualized (Guo, 2013). See Table 1 for a summary of the taxonomies discussed in
the following section. Some studies have emphasized predicting and identifying positive cyber
behaviors, while others focus on predicting negative behaviors. This method of research,
however, may be problematic because antecedents of positive behaviors, like policy compliance,
may be inherently distinct from antecedents of negative, risky cyber behaviors. Loch, Carr, and
Warkentin (1992) defined a four-dimensional model of threats, such that the type of threat
depends on the source (internal or external), perpetrator (human or non-human), intention
(intentional or accidental), and consequences (disclosure of information, modification,
destruction, or denial of service). Similarly, Im and Baskerville (2005) stated that threats caused
by people are either accidental or deliberate. They further clarified that deliberate threats involve
two components: mode and motive. Modes of carrying out the threat involve physical assault of
the system, falsification, malicious code, and cracking of the security infrastructure. Motive can
be fraud, espionage, or vandalism (Im & Baskerville, 2005).
Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2005) adopted a two-factor taxonomy of end
user security behaviors: user expertise and user intentions. Every cyber-security behavior
performed by employees involves some amount of technical expertise on the employee’s part,
ranging from little expertise to expert knowledge of computers and software systems. The second
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dimension, user intentions, captures the intentionality of the behaviors, ranging from benevolent
to malicious intentions (Stanton et al., 2005). Based on interviews conducted with information
security technology professionals, managers, and regular employees, they defined six categories
of cyber-security behaviors arranged along the two dimensions of expertise and intentions
(Stanton et al., 2005). These six categories include intentional destruction, detrimental misuse,
dangerous tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance, and basic hygiene (Stanton et al, 2005).
Intentional destruction behavior involves a relatively high level of expertise paired with
intentions to harm the organization’s information infrastructure. An example of such a behavior
would be an employee who breaks into an organization’s protected files to steal information
(Stanton et al., 2005). Detrimental misuse does not require a high level of technical expertise, but
still includes an intention of harm, possibly through “annoyance, harassment, rule breaking etc.”
(Stanton et al., 2005, p. 126). For example, an employee might use the company email to send
spam to market a sideline business. Dangerous tinkering, unlike intentional destruction and
detrimental misuse, does not involve a clear intention of harm. These behaviors require technical
expertise and an example of such a behavior involves an employee who “configures a wireless
gateway that inadvertently allows wireless access to the company’s network by people in passing
cars” (Stanton et al., 2005, p. 126). Naïve mistakes require minimal expertise and no intention to
do harm, however these actions still pose a potential risk to the organization. For example, an
employee might choose an insecure password for their computer, such as “password” or their
birthday.
Aware assurance and basic hygiene behaviors tend to help the organization and are
viewed as behaviors that the organization seeks to promote. Aware assurance behaviors involve a
high level of expertise combined with the intentions of protecting the organization’s information
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technology. An example of such a behavior would be an employee who, by monitoring of their
work computer, recognizes the presence of a backdoor program that would allow illegal access
to the information on their computer. Lastly, basic hygiene behaviors require little expertise but
include a clear intention to protect, and would involve an employee who refuses to reveal their
password to an unknown caller claiming to be from computer services. By creating these
categories, Stanton et al. (2005) were able to organize specific behaviors into a manageable
taxonomy. They specifically clarify that individuals who engage in one type of behavior may
also engage in other types of behaviors. This taxonomy may help with assessing security related
behaviors, and provides a useful framework for further classifying specific behaviors into
broader categories in order to more manageably identify employees who tend to practice
different cyber-security behaviors.
Seeing the need for further reconceptualization of cyber-related behaviors, Guo (2013)
organized a new framework based on dimensions used in the current cyber literature. Guo (2013)
used five dimensions: intentionality, motive, expertise, job relatedness, and consequence. Guo
(2013) suggested that employees intentionally or unintentionally engage in a given behavior,
may have malicious or non-malicious motive, and may have varying degrees of information
technology expertise. Additionally, some behaviors may be more related to an employee’s job
than others. Lastly, employee cyber-related behaviors can have a range of consequences for the
organization, ranging from improved security to direct damage to the organization.
Using those dimensions, Guo (2013) classified information security-related behavior into
four categories: security assurance behaviors (SABs), security compliant behaviors (SCBs),
security risk-taking behaviors (SRBs), and security damaging behaviors (SDBs). According to
Guo (2013) these categories are designed to be distinct from each other, meaning that factors
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influencing these behaviors may be inherently different and should be studied with this in mind.
Ideally, organizations want to promote SABs and SCBs while preventing SRBs and SDBs.
Security Assurance Behaviors
SABs are behaviors in which an employee has clear intent to help protect an
organization’s information security (Guo, 2013). SABs are effortful, benevolent actions on the
part of the employee, and typically involve going above and beyond what is required by the
organization in order to protect information security. Like Stanton et al’s (2005) aware assurance
and basic hygiene behaviors, Guo (2013) suggests that employees need a high level of
technological expertise (e.g. identifying a virus), though it can be argued that there are simpler
actions, like choosing a strong password and monitoring your computer for signs of a virus,
which can be performed by any end user. These behaviors may be related to organizational
citizenship behaviors (Organ, 1988) because they are benevolent in nature and demonstrate a
desire to help the organization.
Security Compliance Behaviors
SCBs are “behaviors that are in line with organizational security policies” (Guo, 2013, p.
248). While SABs are deliberate behaviors, SCBs may be a result of action or inaction.
Employees might simply be following information security rules or not engaging in risky or
damaging behavior. Past research has identified extrinsic and intrinsic motivational factors that
may influence compliant behaviors, but not personality factors (Padayachee, 2012). Padayachee
(2012) notes, however, that certain personality traits could contribute to an employee’s sense of
personal conduct and should be a focus of future research. Antecedents of compliance intention
include employee past behavior, severity and certainty of punishment, organizational norms and
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peer behavior, and the extent to which their compliance is effective for organizational
information security (Herath & Rao, 2009; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012).
Security Risk Behaviors
SRBs are “behaviors that may put the organization’s information security at risk” and
involve actions in which employees “do what they are expected not to do” (Guo, 2013, p. 248249). Employees engaging in these behaviors might not intend to harm the organization, but
rather may view these behaviors as convenient for getting their job done (Guo, 2013).
Regardless, any risk behavior may have negative consequences for the organization. Employees
with any level of technological expertise can perform these behaviors. Some examples of SRBs
could include walking away from your computer without locking it first, or writing down a work
password where others might see it. SRBs are conceptually similar to Stanton et al.’s (2005)
naïve mistakes and dangerous tinkering behaviors and non-malicious security violations
(NSMV) as defined by Guo, Yuan, Archer, and Connelly (2011). Guo et al. (2011) showed that
employee intentions to perform NSMVs are higher if they believe that doing so will improve
their job performance.
Security Damaging Behaviors
SDBs are behaviors that organizations prohibit employees from doing and will cause
damage to the organization’s information security. These behaviors are generally malicious in
nature and can result in disciplinary action both by the organization and government. SDBs are
generally considered to be more severe than SRBs. These behaviors may require a high level of
technological expertise on the part of the employee and could be considered similar in nature to
organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).
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For the purposes of the present study, Guo’s (2013) taxonomy of cyber-security
behaviors are used as the basis for scale creation. Using these four categories of behavior as a
framework, items describing each behavior are tested to determine the underlying factor
structure of behaviors. This will allow researchers to measure these behaviors and utilize the
scale for future use in predicting and evaluating these behaviors in the workplace.
Factor Structure of Cyber Behaviors
The first goal of this thesis is to determine the nature of cyber-security behaviors. As
discussed earlier, previous research has classified cyber behaviors along several different
taxonomies (i.e. Guo, 2013; Lock et al., 1992; Stanton et al., 2005), but little has been done to
determine the factor structure underlying these behaviors. Although studies in the information
security context frequently measure behavioral intentions, rather than actual behaviors, it is
preferable to measure the latter rather than the former. Even though there is a link between
intentions and behavior, intentions do not always lead to behaviors. This is especially troubling
because it only takes one risky behavior to put an organization’s information in jeopardy
(Crossler et al., 2013). For this reason, the current study intends to assess the frequency of cybersecurity behaviors, using a 23-item measure covering security assurance, compliance, risk, and
damaging behaviors. Because past research in cyber-security focuses primarily on behavioral
intentions from a single type of security behavior, no single measure adequately covers behaviors
from all four areas. This thesis will not only determine the structural nature of the data to
determine if the data fits a four factor model, but also validate a scale aims to provide a
foundation of measurement for these behaviors.
Research Question 1: What is the underlying factor structure of cyber-security
behaviors?
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Personality
For many years, researchers have attempted to define and organize personality traits for
personnel selection purposes (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Trait theory is arguably the best way to
study personality (Korzaan & Boswell, 2005; McCrae & Costa, 2012). A widely accepted
taxonomy of personality is the Five Factor Model, with origins from McDougall (1932), who
stated, “personality may with advantage be broadly analyzed into five distinguishable but
inseparable factors, namely, intellect, character, temperament, disposition, and temper” (p.15).
Norman (1963) later labeled the five factors extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness,
contentiousness, and culture based on the work of Fiske (1949), who found that data fit a five
factor model well. McCrae and Costa (1985, 1987) confirmed this framework of a five factor
model. Norman’s (1963) five factors are commonly known as the “Big Five”. The Big Five
factors have been shown to be independent of cognitive ability (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Though
there has been some debate about the definition about each other factors (Barrick & Mount,
1991), some common terms used to describe each factor are presented below.
Extraversion
Extraversion involves interpersonal tendencies, and is associated with traits such as
sociability, gregariousness, assertiveness, talkativeness, and activeness (Barrick & Mount, 1991).
It has also been defined using facets of enthusiasm and assertiveness (DeYoung, 2006;
DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, 2007).
Emotional Stability
Emotional Stability (Neuroticism) is a generally agreed upon dimension (Barrick &
Mount, 1991). It involves emotional adjustment, and includes facets such as anxiety, anger,
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embarrassment, worry, insecurity, vulnerability, impulsiveness, volatility, withdrawal (Barrick &
Mount, 1991; DeYoung, 2006; DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, 2007).
Agreeableness
Agreeableness also involves interpersonal tendencies, and reflects concern for
cooperation and social harmony. Facets include; cooperation, compassion, forgiving, modesty,
lack of hostility, nurturance, politeness, trust, and tolerance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; DeYoung,
2006; DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, 2007). This dimension is often associated with prosocial
elements (Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, & Gardner, 2011).
Conscientiousness
Though there is some debate about the label, it has been defined as involving
dependability, being careful, thorough, responsible, organized, and planful (Barrick & Mount,
1991), as well as the tendency to be self-disciplined.
Openness to Experience
Openness to Experience has also be called Culture (Norman, 1963). Traits associated
with this factor include imaginative, cultured, curious, original, broad-minded, intelligent, and
artistically sensitive (Barrick & Mount, 1991).
Personality and Cyber Behaviors
Do certain personality traits predict relevant cyber-security behaviors? The second goal
of this thesis is to determine if personality traits are related to these behaviors. Given that cybersecurity behavior research is a relatively new area of exploration, little has been done to examine
the relationship between personality variables and different cyber-security related behaviors in
organizations. While personality is more distal than situational variables, identifying those traits
that predict cyber behaviors can aid organizations in selecting individuals who will engage in
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compliance and assurance behaviors, rather than simply relying on training after hire. The
present study investigates the predictive ability of the Big Five personality dimensions on the
four types of cyber-security related behaviors as defined by Guo (2013).
I hypothesize that conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience will be
valid predictors of security assurance behaviors (SABs). Chiaburu et al. (2011) found that
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience are the strongest predictors of
organizationally directed Organizational Citizenship behaviors, probably due to the prosocial
nature of the items in the measure. Conscientiousness is expected to be positively related to
SABs because it involves prosocial characteristics, and conscientious individuals possess the
desire to protect the organization. Thus, highly conscientious individuals would go the “extra
step” to ensure that work information is secure. Agreeableness is expected to be positively
related to SABs. Similar to conscientiousness, agreeableness is related to prosocial
characteristics and thus may contribute to a desire to help and protect the organization. Lastly,
openness to experience will predict SABs. Barrick & Mount (1991) found that openness to
experience is related to training performance, so those high on this trait may be more receptive to
information security training, and act out those trained behaviors to protect the organization’s
information security.
Hypothesis 1a: Conscientiousness will be positively related to security assurance
behaviors.
Hypothesis 1b: Conscientiousness will predict security assurance behaviors, such that
individuals high in conscientiousness will engage in more security assurance behaviors than
individuals low in conscientiousness.
Hypothesis 1c: Agreeableness will be positively related to security assurance behaviors.
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Hypothesis 1d: Agreeableness will predict security assurance behaviors, such that
individuals high in agreeableness will engage in more security assurance behaviors than
individuals low in agreeableness.
Hypothesis 1e: Openness to Experience will be positively related to security assurance
behaviors.
Hypothesis 1f: Openness to Experience will predict security assurance behaviors, such
that individuals high in openness to experience will engage in more security assurance behaviors
than individuals low in openness to experience.
Conscientiousness will be related to SCBs, as past research has shown that
conscientiousness is related to rule-following behavior (Hu et al., 2012). Hu et al. (2012) found
that dutifulness was positively related to information security compliance intentions, which is a
facet of conscientiousness. Individuals high in conscientiousness will have a high propensity to
follow organizational policy, thus engaging in security compliance behaviors.
Hypothesis 2a: Conscientiousness will be positively related to security compliance
behaviors.
Hypothesis 2b: Conscientiousness will predict security compliance behaviors, such that
individuals high in conscientiousness will engage in more security compliance behaviors than
individuals low in conscientiousness.
I hypothesize that conscientiousness will predict security risk behaviors.
Conscientiousness will be negatively related to risk behaviors, since individuals low in
conscientiousness will be more willing to engage in risk behaviors because they will be less
likely to take the consequences of such behaviors into consideration.
Hypothesis 3a: Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security risk behaviors.
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Hypothesis 3b: Conscientiousness will predict security risk behaviors, such that
individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in more security risk behaviors than individuals
high in conscientiousness.
I predict that emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness will predict
security damaging behaviors (SDBs). Berry, Ones, and Sackett (2007) found that these three
traits relate to organizational deviance, and I expect a similar relationship to these traits and
SDBs, given the nature of these damaging behaviors. Individuals low in emotional stability may
be volatile and impulsive, increasing the propensity to engage in damaging behaviors. Similarly,
individuals low in agreeableness and conscientiousness may have a tendency to be hostile and
lack need for cooperation and self-discipline, making damaging behaviors more likely.
Hypothesis 4a: Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security damaging
behaviors.
Hypothesis 4b: Conscientiousness will predict security damaging behaviors, such that
individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in more security damaging behaviors than
individuals high in conscientiousness.
Hypothesis 4c: Agreeableness will be negatively related to security damaging behaviors.
Hypothesis 4d: Agreeableness will predict security damaging behaviors, such that
individuals low in agreeableness will engage in more security damaging behaviors than
individuals high in agreeableness.
Hypothesis 4e: Emotional Stability will be negatively related to security damaging
behaviors.
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Hypothesis 4f: Emotional Stability will predict security damaging behaviors, such that
individuals low in emotional stability will engage in more security damaging behaviors than
individuals high in emotional stability.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational citizenship behaviors, alternatively known as contextual performance,
(Borman & Motowidlo, 1993) or extra-role behaviors (Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995)
were defined by Organ (1988) as “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or
explicitly recognized by the formal reward system and that in aggregate promotes the effective
functioning of the organization” (p. 4). This definition has been criticized by more recent
research because OCBs are often viewed as a requirement by supervisors and related to
performance evaluations, and thus, reward systems (Organ, 1997; Podsakoff, Whiting,
Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009). Smith, Organ, and Near (1983) conceptualized OCBs as altruism
and compliance behaviors, while Borman and Motowidlo (1993) expanded the criterion domain
to a five-dimension taxonomy: persisting with enthusiasm, volunteering to carry out non-role
tasks, helping and cooperating with others, following organizational rules and procedures, and
endorsing, and supporting, and defending organizational objectives.
Williams and Anderson (1991) conceptualized a framework that focused on the target
rather than the context of behavior. This framework defined OCBI as those helpful behaviors
directed toward other individuals (e.g. helping others who have been absent) and OCBO as those
behaviors that benefit the organization (e.g. attendance at work is above the norm). While metaanalysis has brought into question whether the distinction between facets of OCB is meaningful
(LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002), they are measured separately for this thesis, because of the
conceptual relationships with cyber-security behaviors.
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OCBs and Cyber Behaviors
To the best of my knowledge, past research has not yet investigated the relationship
between OCBs and cyber-security behaviors. Thus, the third goal of this thesis is to determine if
cyber behaviors and OCBs are related. By understanding the relationship between citizenship
behaviors and cyber behaviors, researchers can gain a better understanding about the nature and
measurement cyber behaviors. Security assurance behaviors are those behaviors taken by an
employee that actively protect an organization’s information (Guo, 2013). Because these
behaviors involve a proactive component to help the organization, they are conceptually related
to organizationally directed OCBs. Similarly, security compliance behaviors will be related to
organizationally directed OCBs. While security compliance behaviors do not necessarily involve
behaviors that proactively protect the organization’s information, cyber-security compliance is
not typically considered part of an employee’s task performance and may be viewed by the
employee as an action that goes above and beyond their expected job performance. See Figure 1
for the conceptual model. Thus, I hypothesize the following relationships:
Hypothesis 5a: Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors will be
positively related to security assurance behaviors.
Hypothesis 5b: Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors will be
positively related to security compliance behaviors.
Hypothesis 5c: Security assurance and security compliance behaviors will be more
strongly related to organizationally directed citizenship behaviors than interpersonally directed
citizenship behaviors.
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Counterproductive Work Behaviors
Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) are often defined as employee behaviors that
are viewed as contrary to the goals of the organization (Sackett & Devore, 2001). Additionally,
these behaviors have the possibility, but not guarantee of causing harm to the organization,
which is important because it reflects nature of the behaviors themselves, not outcomes
(Hoffman & Dilchert, 2012). While some authors define CWBs as intentional behaviors
(Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Sackett, 2002), others view this idea as problematic, because some
unintentional employee behaviors are contrary to the legitimate interests of the organization
(Hoffman & Dilchert, 2012; Motowidlo, 2003). Though there has been some debate about the
underlying structure of CWBs, Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) conceptual model of CWBs is
widely used in the literature. Using multidimensional scaling, Robinson and Bennett (1995)
identified four quadrants of deviant behaviors along two dimensions, severity and target of those
deviant behaviors. The first quadrant, labeled property deviance, involves serious,
organizationally directed deviant behaviors. The second quadrant, labeled property deviance,
involves minor, organizationally directed deviant behaviors. The third quadrant, political
deviance, involves interpersonally directed but minor deviant behaviors. The last quadrant,
personal aggression, involved severe, interpersonally directed behaviors.
Using this work as a basis for scale development, Bennett and Robinson (2000)
developed and validated a workplace deviance scale with two subscales, organizational deviance
(OD) and interpersonal deviance (ID). Organizational deviance is defined as behaviors, which
employees engage that are targeted towards the organization (e.g. damaging company property,
sharing confidential company information), while interpersonal deviance is defined as those
behaviors in which employees perform that are targeted towards other individuals (e.g. gossip,
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theft from coworkers) (Bennett and Robinson, 2000; Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007).
Confirmatory factor analysis offered support for this two-factor model, and there is evidence for
both convergent and discriminant validity (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). While there has been
some criticisms that the high correlation (ρ = .62) between these two factors indicates that they
are empirically indistinguishable, Berry, et al. (2007) meta-analytically determined that the
differential relationships between the two factors and the Big Five and OCBs indicated that these
factors are separate.
CWBs and Cyber Behaviors
Similar to OCBs, no past research has examined the relationships between cyber related
behaviors and CWBs. Therefore, one of the goals of this thesis is to determine if cyber behaviors
are similar to certain forms of CWBs. Conceptually, there are several reasons while security risk
and damaging behaviors will be related to organizational deviance (See Figure 2 for the
conceptual model). First, both risk and damaging behaviors involve those behaviors that have the
potential of harming the organization (Guo, 2013). Second, these behaviors can be intentional or
unintentional, much like traditional definitions of CWBs. Third, security risk and damaging
behaviors are organizationally, rather than interpersonally directed, because they put an
organization’s information security at risk, rather than directly harming specific individuals
(Guo, 2013). Thus I propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6a: Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors will be
positively related to security risk behaviors.
Hypothesis 6b: Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors will be
positively related to security damaging behaviors.
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Hypothesis 6c: Security risk and security damaging behaviors will be more strongly
related to organizational deviance than interpersonal deviance.
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Chapter Two
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 477 individuals recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk system
who work in the United States at a variety of organizations and occupations. Participants were
required to work at least 10 hours per week, work in the United States, and use a computer at
work. The sample was 52.6% female and an average age of 36 years old (SD = 11.86).
Participants reported working an average of 38.37 hours (SD = 10.13) per week and using a
computer an average of 26 hours (SD = 14.35) per week while at work. Additionally, 6.5% of
participants working in an information technology related job (e.g. systems administrator,
programmer). 42.8% of participants held a bachelor’s degree, 23.5% had some college, 10.9%
held an associate’s degree, 9.9% a master’s degree, and 2.7% a professional or doctoral degree.
Participants who were interested in completing the study posted on Amazon Turk’s
website received a link to an external Qualtrics survey. They were first asked to read and
acknowledge an understanding of the consent form, giving consent to participate in the study.
Next, they completed several demographic questions (e.g. gender, age, job title), frequency of
computer use at work, a measure of perceptions of penalty severity, the IPIP personality selfreport inventory, the OCB and CWB measures, and the cyber-security behavior inventory. To
ensure confidentiality, no participant names or personal information were attached to the
responses. Due to the sensitive nature of the questions and to ensure the most honest responses,
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participants were assured that this information would be used for research purposes only.
Participants were compensated $.50 for completing the survey.
Measures
Cyber-Security Behaviors
Cyber-security behaviors were measured using a 23-item scale comprised of selfdeveloped and items adapted from previous research, based on Guo’s (2013) conceptual model.
These items measured a wide range of cyber-security behaviors that may be useful in
understanding the underlying factor structure of cyber-security behaviors. Participants were
asked to respond to the statement “Please indicate the frequency in which these you have
engaged in each of the following behaviors in the past year” on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (never) to 7 (16 or more times). See Appendix A for the complete list of items.
Big Five Personality
The Big Five personality factors were measured using the 10-item International
Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999; Goldberg et al., 2006) scales for emotional
stability, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The scale
will contain a total of 50 items. The scales showed good internal consistency in the current study,
with α = 0.79 for emotional stability, α = 0.89 for extraversion, α = 0.84 for openness to
experience, α = 0.87 for agreeableness, and α = 0.84 for conscientiousness.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational citizenship behaviors were adapted from Williams and Anderson’s (1991)
measures of OCBI (7 items) and OCBO (6 items). Both the OCBI and OCBO scales had
adequate reliability (α = .78 and .69, respectively). Participants were asked to respond to the
statement “Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the
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following behaviors in the past year” on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5
(always).
Counterproductive Work Behaviors
Counterproductive work behaviors were measured using Bennett and Robinson’s (2000)
scales measuring interpersonal and organizational deviance. The 7-item interpersonal deviance
scale showed excellent reliability (α = .91), as did the 12-item organizational deviance scale (α =
.90). Participants were asked to indicate the frequency, which they have engaged in each
behavior in the past year on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5(always).
Demographics and Control Variables
In addition to the above measures, participants were asked to report their age, gender,
level of education, weekly computer use at work, job tenure, job title, and perceived severity of
punishment. Perceptions of severity of penalty for breaking organizational security rules were
measured using 3 items adapted from Herath and Rao (2009). This scale included the questions
“The organization disciplines employees who break information security rules”, “My
organization terminates employees who repeatedly break security rules”, and “If I were caught
violating organization information security policies, I would be severely punished” (Herath and
Rao, 2009, p. 164), and were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly
Agree). The scale had good reliability (α = .88). Because perceptions of severity of penalty could
affect the frequency of cyber-security behaviors, this data was analyzed with this construct as a
control.
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Chapter Three
Results
Frequency of Cyber-Security Behaviors
Means, standard deviations, range, and frequency of all cyber-security scale items are
presented in Table 3. Because participants reported the frequency in which they performed a
variety of cyber-security related behaviors, it is interesting to evaluate the extent to which
employees from a wide variety of occupations are performing not only positive, but also negative
cyber behaviors. An overwhelming majority of respondents reported using a secure password
(i.e. a password containing letters, numbers, and symbols) for their work computer (93.1%),
following information security policies (95.6%) and using good information security practices at
work, though less than half (43.8%) reported that they change their password more often than
their employer requires. Most respondents also reported that they monitor their work computer
for signs of a virus or malware (75.3%) and immediately delete suspicious emails on their work
email without reading them (79.5%). 75.3% of respondents said they have walked away from
their computer without locking it first, while about a quarter reported that they have shared their
work account user name or password with a friend or coworker (24.3%) or written their
password down and left it where others might see it (28.1%). 35.1% of respondents reported that
they have copied work information onto a personal USB drive, 21.2% have communicated
confidential information on an unsecured network, and 12.6% have tried to crack the firework on
their work computer to access prohibited websites. While it is evident that positive cyber
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behaviors are more prevalent, it is important to note that a substantial proportion of respondents
have engaged in risky or potentially damaging cyber behaviors in the past year.
Cyber-Security Scale Dimensions
In order to answer research question 1, factor analysis was used evaluate the dimensions
of cyber security behaviors using a 23-item scale. Because no prior research has looked at a full
range of behaviors within one scale, exploratory factor analysis was used to first determine the
most likely factor structure, followed by confirmatory factor analysis to validate the results from
the EFA. In order to conduct the EFA, I randomly selected approximately half of the responses
from the overall sample, resulting in a sample of 238 participants. EFA operates under the
common factor model, which assumes that each measured variable had common and unique
variance, and that underlying common factors can explain the correlations among measured
variables.
Two commonly used extraction algorithm for EFA are maximum likelihood (ML) and
principal axis factoring (PAF). Each method estimates parameters according to assumptions of
the common factor model, but differ in how those parameters are estimated (Fabrigar &
Wegener, 2012). Both ML and PAF are iterative techniques, meaning that they repeat until the
communalities between two different iterations are very similar, however solutions need to be
rotated for interpretability (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). ML assumes that the data are based on a
random sample and that the measured variables have a multivariate normal distribution (Fabrigar
& Wegener, 2012). The goal of ML is to estimate the factor loadings and unique variances as to
maximize the likelihood function. Unlike PAF, ML provides a likelihood ratio test (χ2) statistic
as an indicator of model fit, though it is highly sensitive to sample size. While ML provides
additional information about fit and performs slightly better than PAF when factors are
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correlated and there are unequal loadings within factors (de Winter & Dodou, 2012), it tends to
over factor solutions. Additionally, PAF is typically good at recovering factors with low loadings
(de Winter & Dodou, 2012).
While in general both ML and PAF are reasonable extraction techniques for EFA, PAF
provides a more robust solution in circumstances where the observed variables are non-normal
(Fabrigar et al., 1999). Evaluation of items on the cyber-security scale indicated that some items
intended to measure security damaging behaviors were significantly positively skewed, and had
significant kurtosis. The non-normality of these types of behaviors is not unexpected however,
given the infrequency of some of the more extreme cyber damaging behaviors. Because of the
moderate violation of non-normality, ML is inappropriate to use as an extraction technique.
Therefore PAF was used as the factor identification and extraction technique for EFA.
Because the factors of cyber-security behaviors are likely correlated, oblique rotation was
used in the analysis. One of the most commonly used oblique rotation methods is promax
rotation, which transforms the initial solution by raising factor loadings to a power of two or
more (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). Factor loadings are raised by the kappa parameter, and higher
values produce bigger correlations between factors (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). Given the
sufficiency of results produced by promax, this rotation method was used.
The initial factor analysis with promax with Kaiser Normalization extracted five factors
that were shown on the scree plot, and had an eigenvalue greater than one. Items with factor
loadings lower than .4 were used as a cutoff. Though a fifth factor was extracted during the
factor analysis, no items loaded strongly onto this factor. Therefore, in order to extract a more
parsimonious solution, the EFA was rerun with a maximum of 4 factors extracted. This four
factor solution converged after 7 iterations and items with factor loadings lower than .4 were
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deleted. Items “Immediately deleted suspicious emails in your work email without reading them”
and “Refused to tell anyone your work ID or password” were heavily cross loaded on factors 2
and 4, and were subsequently deleted from the scale. The factor analysis was rerun on the
remaining 21 items to obtain a final 4-factor solution, which is readily interpretable. In this
solution, each item loaded strongly onto one factor. Together, the four factors accounted for
57.8% of the variance. Item factor loadings and factors are presented in Table 4. For the
purposes of this paper and to be consistent with proposed hypotheses, the final four factors
extracted were labeled security assurance behaviors (SABs), security compliance behaviors
(SCBs), security risk behaviors (SRBs), and security damaging behaviors (SDBs).
Security damaging behaviors accounted for the most variance (31.4%) and therefore
appeared to be most important for the scale, perhaps in part because this dimension contained the
most items. This dimension is comprised of items SDB 1-6, as well as SRB4, SRB5, and SRB6.
This dimension seems to encompass not only some of the more severe behaviors, but also some
risk behaviors such as copying work information on a personal USB drive, installing
unauthorized software from the internet onto your computer, and using your social security
number as your password. The security compliance behaviors dimension accounted for second
most variance (13.1%), and is comprised of items SCB 1-4, as well as SAB4 (using a secure
password for your work computer). While SAB4 was originally intended to measure an
assurance behavior, it is not unreasonable for this to be considered a security compliance
behavior, given that many companies require employees to use strong passwords for their user
accounts. The third dimension, security risk behaviors, accounted for 7.78% of the variance, and
was comprised of SRB1, SRB2, SRB3, and SRB7. These items all involved behaviors about
computer passwords, so it makes theoretical sense that these items loaded together. The last
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dimension, security assurance behaviors, accounted for 5.61% of the variance and is comprised
of items SAB1, SAB5, and SAB6, which measured the frequency in which people monitor their
work computer for signs of a virus/malware, changed their password frequency, or went above
and beyond what their organization required to protect their work information.
Scale Validation
In order to validate the factor structure of the cyber-security scale, confirmatory factor
analysis was conducted on the second half of the data (N = 239) not used in the exploratory
factor analysis. As with EFA, one of the most common estimation methods is maximum
likelihood, which assumes normality in the data. Because there is evidence of non-normality in
the data, I used an alternative estimation method, MLR, which has standard errors robust to nonnormality and an adjusted chi-square statistic that uses a scaling factor to correct for the degree
of non-normality (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). A four-factor model based on the results of the
exploratory factor analysis was fit to the data using Mplus. A marker variable strategy, in which
the first item on each latent factor is fixed to 1.00, was used for model identification purposes.
In order to determine if the model fit the data, overall fit indices, factor loadings, and
residual correlations were considered. When examining overall fit indices, a non-significant chisquare test indicates any differences between the observed and model-implied covariance
matrices may be due to sampling error and it can be argued that the model is plausible.
Standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR), root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and Tucker-Lewis (TLI) were evaluated for overall fit.
According to the recommendations of Hu and Bentler (1999), smaller SRMR values indicate
better fit and values less than .08 indicate adequate fit and RMSEA values less than .06 are
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considered good fit. CFI and TLI both index the discrepancy between the tested model and null
model, and values greater than .95 indicate good fit.
For this model, the Satorra-Bentler chi-square test was significant (χ2 = 346.815, p <.001)
however this fit measure is highly sensitive to sample size and other fit indices should be
considered. CFI and TLI were .86 and .84 respectively, which indicated adequate fit. RMSEA
was .06 and SRMR was .07, also indicating good fit. Additionally, standardized factor loadings
were adequate (most over .6) with the exception of one item, “walked away from your computer
without locking it first”, which had a non-significant loading (.177) on the SRB factor. Because
the model did not explain significant variance in that item and in consideration of parsimony in
the scale, the item was removed and the subsequent factor model was fit to the data. Removal of
that item resulted in an improvement in global model fit indices. While the Satorra-Bentler chisquare test statistic was still significant (χ2 = 290.99, p <.001), other measures of fit improved
(CFI = .89, TLI = .87, RMSEA=.057), standardized factor loadings ranged from .40-.89 (See
Table 5). Because the models were non-nested, I could not conduct a scaled chi-square
difference test, however with the consideration of theory and parsimony in the scale, the model
without SRB7 is preferred in this case. See Table 6 for global fit indices of both models.
In order to compute scale reliability for each cyber-security subscale, I used composite
reliability rather than Cronbach’s alpha. Because loading values are unequal within each scale,
composite reliability is preferred over alpha because alpha tends to underestimate reliability
(Raykov, 1997). The reliabilities were .63, .75, .63, and .89 for SAB, SCB, SRB, and SDB
dimensions, respectively. The low reliability for the SAB and SRB scales may be due to the
heterogeneity and low number of items in each scale. Interfactor correlations suggested that the
factors are related, but unique. The SAB dimension is significantly related to SCB and SDB (.44
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and .13, respectively), but not to SRB (.043, p = .62). SCB was significantly negatively related to
SRB (-.35, p<.01) and SDB (-.33, p<.01). SRB and SDB were significant positively related (.75,
p<.001). Thus, for the purposes of hypothesis testing, the final cyber-security scales contained 3,
5, 3, and 9 items measuring SABs, SCBs, SRBs, and SDBs, respectively.
Hypothesis Testing
For all further analyses, the entire sample was used (N = 477). Means, standard
deviations, skewness, and kurtosis values for all study variables are presented in Table 7. As
previously discussed, cyber-security behaviors, organizational citizenship and counterproductive
work behaviors were measured on 7 and 5-point Likert scales, respectively, with “1” indicating
that respondents had not performed that behavior in the past year. Personality was measured on a
5-point Likert scale of accuracy, with “3” indicating that a given personality item was neither
inaccurate nor accurate in describing the respondent. Overall, respondents performed more
individually directed (M = 3.65, SD = .67) and organizationally directed (M = 4.08, SD = .58)
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) than individually directed (M = 1.47, SD = .66) and
organizationally directed (M = 1.64, SD = .61) counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs).
Similarly, they performed more SABs (M = 3.48, SD = 1.50) and SCBs (M = 5.48, SD = 1.39)
than SRBs (M = 1.95, SD = 1.18) and SDBs (M = 1.46, SD = .81).
Next, correlational analyses were conducted to test select hypotheses. See Table 8 for
zero-order correlations between all variables. Reliabilities are reported on the diagonal, and are
coefficient alpha for all scales, except for the cyber-security dimensions, which are composite
reliability. Security assurance behaviors were positively related to conscientiousness (r = .18, p
<.001), agreeableness (r = .15, p <.001), openness to experience (r = .11, p <.05), supporting
Hypotheses 1a, 1c, and 1e. Though not hypothesized, emotional stability was also positively
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related to SABs (r = .19, p <.001). It should be noted that due to the low reliability of this scale,
however, relationships could be attenuated. Conscientiousness was positively related to security
compliance behaviors (r = .27, p <.001), supporting Hypothesis 2a. Additionally, agreeableness
(r = .29, p <.001), openness to experience (r = .27, p <.001), and emotional stability (r = .21, p
<.001) were positively related to SCBs. Conscientiousness was negatively related to security risk
behaviors (r = -.21, p <.001), supporting hypothesis 3a. Agreeableness (r = -.14, p <.01),
openness to experience (r = -.16, p <.001), and emotional stability (r = -.18, p <.001) were also
negatively related to SRBs. Lastly, conscientiousness (r = -.32, p <.001), agreeableness (r = -.29,
p <.001), and emotional stability (r = -.11, p <.05), were negatively related to security damaging
behaviors supporting hypotheses 4a, 4c, and 4e.
Additional correlational analyses were conducted to determine if cyber-security
behaviors were related to two types of organizational citizenship and counterproductive work
behaviors. SABs were significantly, positively related to both individually directed (r = .18, p
<.001) and organizationally directed (r = .15, p <.01) OCBs, which supports hypothesis 5a.
Additionally, SCBs were significantly, positively related to both individually directed (r = .22, p
<.001) and organizationally directed (r = .44, p <.001) OCBs, which supporting hypothesis 5b.
Conversely, organizationally directed OCBs are strongly, negatively related both SRBs (r = -.40,
p <.001) and SDBs (r = -.55, p <.001). Therefore, it appears that individuals who are engaging in
beneficial behaviors towards their organization are complying with or going above and beyond
organizational policy but are engaging in fewer risky or damaging cyber behaviors. SRBs were
significantly positively related to interpersonal deviance (r = .43, p <.001) and organizational
deviance (r = .48, p <.001), supporting hypothesis 6a. SDBs were also significantly positively
related to interpersonal deviance (r = .61, p <.001) and organizational deviance (r = .61, p
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<.001), supporting hypothesis 6b. These results suggest that individuals who are engaging in
counterproductive work behaviors are also engaging in cyber-security risk and damaging
behaviors.
Post hoc t-tests were conducted with Steiger’s (1980) equation for dependent correlations
to test hypotheses 5c and 6c and examine if the correlations previously mentioned are
significantly different from each other. Hypothesis 5c stated that SABs and SCBs would be
more strongly related to OCBs than interpersonally directed OCBs. Post hoc analysis revealed
that the correlation between SABs and individually directed OCBs is not significantly different
from the correlation between SABs and organizationally directed OCBs (t = .65, p =.52).
However, the correlation between SCBs and organizationally directed OCBs was significantly
higher than the correlation between SCBs and individually directed OCBs (t = -4.68, p
<.001).Thus, hypothesis 5c was partially supported. Hypothesis 6c stated that SRBs and SDBs
would be more strongly related to organizational deviance than interpersonal deviance. There
were no significant differences in the relationships between SRBs and both types of deviance (t
= -1.81, p =.07). Similarly, there were no significant differences between SDBs and both types
of deviance (t = .14, p =.89). Therefore, hypothesis 6c was not supported.
A series of hierarchical linear regressions analyses were performed to test the remaining
hypotheses. Upon further examination of the correlation table, it is important to note that age,
gender, frequency of computer use, and severity of punishment were significantly related to at
least one type of cyber behavior. Therefore, those variables were entered into the subsequent
regression equations in step 1 as controls. See Tables 9-12 for individual regression results. In
order to test hypothesis 1b, conscientiousness was entered into the regression equation in step 2
for predicting SABs. Regression results indicated that conscientiousness was predictive of SABs
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(β =.15, p <.01), even when controlling for demographics and severity of punishment, which was
also a significant predictor (β =.18, p <.001). Thus, hypothesis 1b was supported. Agreeableness
(β =.14, p <.01) and Openness to Experience (β =.10, p <.05) were also significantly, positively
predictive of SABs, supporting hypotheses 1d and 1f. These results suggest that individuals with
higher levels of conscientiousness, agreeableness, or openness to experience may be more likely
to engage in cyber assurance behaviors. Conscientiousness was a significant predictor of SCBs
(β =.19, p <.001), meaning that higher levels of conscientiousness are predictive of more
compliant behavior. This supports hypothesis 2b. Additionally, older individuals (β =.17, p
<.001), those who spend more time on the computer (β =.13, p <.01) and those who perceive that
they will be punished for breaking information security rules (β =.15, p <.01) are also more
likely to engage in compliant behavior.
Conscientiousness was significantly, negatively predictive of SRBs (β =-.18, p <.001),
suggesting that individuals lower in conscientiousness are more likely to engage in risky cyber
behavior (hypothesis 3b – supported). Additionally, those who perceive higher severity of
punishment are less likely to engage in these behaviors (β =-.10, p <.01). Lastly,
conscientiousness (β =-.25, p <.001) and agreeableness (β =-.19, p <.001) were both individually
predictive of SDBs, such that individuals lower on these traits were more likely to engage in
damaging behaviors. These results support hypotheses 4b and 4d. Emotional stability, however,
was not a significant predictor of SDBs (β =-.08, p =.09), so hypothesis 4f was not supported.
Additionally, younger (β =.18, p <.001), male (β =.18, p <.001) participants were more likely to
engage in SDBs at work.
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Additional Analyses
Additional hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to determine if hypothesized
personality traits were incrementally predictive of cyber-security behaviors beyond other Big
Five traits. Results showed that conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience did
not predict SABs above and beyond other Big Five traits. Similarly conscientiousness was not
significantly incrementally predictive of SCBs or SRBs over the other four Big Five traits.
However, conscientiousness had significant incremental validity in predicting SDBs over the
other Big Five traits (β =-.20, p <.001), as did agreeableness (β =-.13, p <.05). This indicates that
these personality traits may be especially helpful in predicting individuals who will engage in
more severe cyber-security behaviors.
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Chapter Four
Discussion
The first goal and research question of this thesis was to explore the dimensionality of
Guo’s (2013) recent conceptualization of cyber-security behaviors. Using the existing literature,
a scale was constructed using items measuring each dimension of this framework. The scale
consisted of a wide variety of cyber-security related behaviors, ranging from positive, proactive
behaviors (e.g. checking your computer for signs of a virus) to more malicious behaviors (e.g.
cracking the firewall on a company computer). Respondents reported engaging in positive and
compliant behaviors more often than risky and damaging, which is good news for organizations.
However, the fact that employees are engaging negative behaviors should be of concern to
organizations, because even one occurrence of a risky cyber related behavior by an employee can
lead to damaging consequences for an organization (Crossler et al., 2013). For example, 28.1%
of participants reported that they had written down their work password where others might see
it. While this behavior itself does not cause immediate damage to an organization’s information,
someone with malicious intent could see that password and use it to gain unauthorized access to
that information.
Factor analysis revealed that there are four factors underlying the items of the new cybersecurity scale, which is consistent with the framework suggested by Guo (2013). These factors
are labeled security assurance behaviors, security compliance behaviors, security risk behaviors,
and security damaging behaviors. Most items load onto their respective factors, with the
exception of the security damaging behaviors dimension. Because some items that were
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originally intended to measure a “risk” behavior, not “damaging” behavior, load on the same
factor as some of the more extreme behaviors, there could be some other underlying
commonality about the behaviors beyond the properties suggested by Guo (2013). Given that all
of the items in this dimension seem to get at behaviors that are counterproductive to an
organization’s information security, that dimension might be best labeled as “counterproductive
cyber behavior” for use in future research.
Correlation and regression analyses reveals that several Big Five personality traits are
significantly related to, and predictive of, cyber-security behaviors. Conscientiousness,
agreeableness, and openness to experience are all significantly positively correlated with and
predictive of security assurance behaviors. This means that individuals higher on these traits are
more likely to go above and beyond what is expected to protect their organization’s information
security. These findings are consistent with Chiaburu et al. (2011), who found that these three
traits are the strongest predictors of prosocial behavior at work. Additionally, individuals high in
openness might be more receptive to any information security training they may have received,
which often encourages employees to proactively protect their work information.
Consistent with past research on cyber-security rule following behavior (Hu et al., 2012),
conscientiousness is significant related to, and predictive of, security compliance behaviors.
Individuals high in conscientiousness are aware of and may want to follow the rules of their
organization; therefore, they adhere to the information security policies put in place by their
organization. Additionally, agreeableness, openness to experience, and emotional stability are
positively related to complaint behavior. Similar to security assurance behaviors, those high in
agreeableness and openness may be more receptive for security training, while those high in
emotional stability have more self-discipline and therefore may be more likely to follow
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compliant procedures rather than risky behavior. Additionally, an interesting, but perhaps not
surprising finding is that individuals who perceive that they will be punished for breaking the
rules are more likely to engage in compliant behavior. Theoretically, if an individual feels like
they will get in trouble for breaking the rules, they will be less likely to break those rules.
Conscientiousness is significantly negatively related to, and predictive of, security risk
behaviors, a dimension that is comprised of items specifically involving risky password
behaviors. Individuals who are lower in conscientiousness might not consider the consequences
of actions such as leaving a password where others might see it or sharing that information with
coworkers or friends. Agreeableness, openness to experience, and emotional stability are also
negatively related to risk behaviors. These findings contradict those by Whitty, Doodson, Creese,
and Hodges (2015), who found that individuals higher on openness to experience were more
likely to share their password with others. Individuals who perceived a higher severity of
punishment are less likely to engage in risky behaviors, possibly because the consequences were
too high if they were to get caught.
As hypothesized, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability are negatively
related to security damaging behaviors. While regression analyses reveals that conscientiousness
and agreeableness are predictive of security damaging behaviors, emotional stability did not
predict these behaviors when controlling for age, sex, computer use, and severity of punishment.
This finding is consistent with Berry et al., (2007) who found that these traits are related to
deviant behavior. Individuals low in conscientiousness and agreeableness may not take
consequences of their actions in to consideration, or may even maliciously act against their
organization if it is beneficial to them. Consistent with prior literature (Whitty et al., 2015),
younger individuals were more likely to engage in security damaging behaviors, perhaps because
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they are more comfortable with technology than older individuals and possess the knowledge to
engage in the behaviors measured by this dimension that require more technological expertise.
Positive cyber behaviors (security assurance and compliance behaviors) are both
positively related to individually directed and interpersonally directed organizational citizenship
behaviors. Employees who go above and beyond their task performance are also likely to engage
in proactive and compliant cyber behaviors, because they likely have a desire to help their
organization. Even though compliant cyber behaviors do not necessarily have a proactive
component from an information security perspective, employees may view them as going above
and beyond what is required of them because cyber related behaviors are often not considered an
inherent part of their task performance. Follow-up analyses indicated that security compliance
behaviors are more strongly related to organizationally-directed organizational citizenship
behaviors than individually directed organizational citizenship behaviors, possibly because
complying with organizational cyber policy is a similar behavior to engaging in other behaviors
that help the organization, rather than coworkers.
Results also indicated that security risk behaviors and security damaging behaviors are
strongly, positively related to both interpersonal and organizational deviance. Given that
organizational citizenship behaviors are positively related to positive cyber behaviors, it makes
sense that counterproductive work behaviors are related to negative cyber behaviors. Individuals
who engage in undesirable behaviors toward their coworkers and organization are also engaging
in behaviors that could put their organization’s information at risk. Additionally, security risk
behaviors and security damaging behaviors are strongly, negatively related to organizationally
directed organizational citizenship behaviors. Overall, these findings indicate that individuals
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who are engaging in behaviors to help their organizational are not necessary the same individuals
who are engaging in risky or damaging cyber behaviors.
Implications
Overall, there are a number of interesting findings of this study. First, cyber behaviors
can potentially be grouped in four distinct dimensions. Second, that while a perhaps more distal
than constructs such as organizational norms or attitudes, personality traits are related to and
predict cyber behaviors. This suggests that organizations may be able to use traditional
personality screening and selection measures to identify employees who may be more likely to
engage in cyber behaviors of interest. Managers should be mindful of the heterogeneity of
personalities of their employees and tailor cyber training programs and workshops accordingly.
Selection, in addition to training for cyber awareness, can also potentially reduce the frequency
of cyber risk behaviors by employees. Third, the finding that OCBs relate positively to SABs and
SCBs, and negatively to SRBs and SDBs suggest that same types of people who are helping the
organization are also not harming it. Therefore, by hiring and retaining employees who are
frequently engaging in OCBs and other positive behaviors, an organization may be able to more
easily foster a culture where positive cyber behaviors are also the norm.
Given the finding that perceptions of severity of punishment were predictive of reduced
SRBs and SDBs, organizations should make it clear to employees that risky and damaging
behaviors will not be tolerated and that consequences are just as severe as breaking other
organizational rules. Additionally, companies should make their policies transparent to
employees, so that there is little ambiguity about what constitutes a negative cyber behavior.
These practices, along with careful selection of employees, can potentially help reduce the risk of
insider threat.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
While this research contributes to the rapidly growing body of cyber-security literature, it
has several limitations. First, the reliability of the SAB and SRB factors is low, which may have
attenuated the relationships between these dimensions and other study variables. Further, the
behaviors in this scale were not inclusive of all cyber-related behavior, but rather a sampling of
behaviors, especially given that technology keeps evolving. New threats mean new opportunities
for information leaks in organizations, and the opportunities for employees to engage in risky or
damaging behaviors only grow. Future research could consider additional threats such as
phishing scams to identify other ways that employees might potentially put organizational
information security at risk.
Because of the cross sectional nature of this study, it is difficult to prove that personality
is causing employees to engage in certain behaviors. Though it is unlikely that cyber behaviors
shape an employee’s personality, it is impossible to say with certainty that there is no
bidirectional relationship. Additionally, because all measures were self-report, participants could
have been inaccurate or misleading about how frequently they engaged in various behaviors. For
example, an employee reporting that they frequently engage in positive cyber behaviors might
believe they are complying with information security policy, but by company standards they are
not. Lastly, this study did not capture the opportunity to perform each behavior. Two employees
within different organizations may both have similar intentions to engage in a risky behavior, but
only one might actually perform that behavior if the opportunity arises. It may be fruitful for
future research to investigate role of opportunity in the link between intention and behavior.
Given these findings, future research should also investigate the interaction between
personality and situation within a given organization, and its influence on employee cyber
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behaviors. Combining these distal and more proximal factors may give a more complete picture
of why employees engage in these behaviors. For example, individuals low in conscientiousness
may be more likely to engage in risky behavior only when there are ambiguous rules surrounding
that behavior, whereas those high in conscientiousness might be less likely to break the rules
regardless of rule ambiguity.
Conclusion
The current study sought to investigate the previously understudied relationships between
cyber-security behaviors, personality, and organizational and counterproductive work behaviors.
Unlike past research, it evaluated the prevalence and antecedents of actual cyber-security
behaviors, rather than attitudes or intentions. Results demonstrate that cyber-security related
behavior can be separated into four distinct categories and that personality traits such as
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience are predictive of the spectrum of
cyber behavior. Further, cyber-related behaviors are related organizational and counterproductive
work behaviors. This research suggests that personality is a useful predictor for cyber-security
behaviors and can potentially be used to mitigate insider threat in the workplace.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary of Current Security Behavior Taxonomies
Reference

Focus

Loch, Carr,
and
Warkentin
(1992)

Threats

Categories of
Behavior
None

Im and
Baskerville
(2005)
Stanton,
Stam,
Mastrangelo,
and Jolton
(2005)

Threats

None

End User
Security
Behaviors

Guo (2013)

Employee
(end user
and IS)
securityrelated
behaviors

Intentional
destruction
Detrimental
misuse
Dangerous
tinkering Naïve
mistakes
Aware
assurance Basic
hygiene
Security
assurance
Security
compliant
Security risktaking
Security
damaging

Dimensions

Range of Behavior

Source
Perpetrator
Intention
Consequences

Internal – External
Human or Non-Human
Intentional or Accidental
Disclosure of information – Denial
of Service
Deliberate or Accidental
Physical-Virtual
Fraud, Espionage, Vandalism
Little expertise – expert knowledge
Benevolent – Malicious

Intention
Mode
Motive
User expertise
User
intentions

Intentionality
Motive
Expertise
Role
Job
relatedness
Consequence
Action
Rule
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Intentional or Unintentional
Beneficial – Malicious
Low – High
End Users or IS People
N/A
Improve Security – Damage
Action or Inaction
Organizational Policy or Law

Table 2. Research Question and Hypothesized Relationships
CyberSecurity
Behaviors

Security
Assurance
Behaviors

Security
Compliance
Behaviors

Security
Risk
Behaviors

Research
Question 1

What is the underlying factor structure of cyber-security
behaviors?

Hypothesis
1a

Conscientiousness will be positively related to security
assurance behaviors.

Hypothesis
1b

Conscientiousness will predict security assurance behaviors,
such that individuals high in conscientiousness will engage in
more security assurance behaviors than individuals low in
conscientiousness.

Hypothesis
1c

Agreeableness will be positively related to security assurance
behaviors.

Hypothesis
1d

Agreeableness will predict security assurance behaviors, such
that individuals high in agreeableness will engage in more
security assurance behaviors than individuals low in
agreeableness.

Hypothesis
1e

Openness to Experience will be positively related to security
assurance behaviors.

Hypothesis
1f

Openness to Experience will predict security assurance
behaviors, such that individuals high in openness to
experience will engage in more security assurance behaviors
than individuals low in openness to experience.

Hypothesis
2a

Conscientiousness will be positively related to security
compliance behaviors.

Hypothesis
2b

Conscientiousness will predict security compliance
behaviors, such that individuals high in conscientiousness
will engage in more security compliance behaviors than
individuals low in conscientiousness.

Hypothesis
3a

Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security risk
behaviors.

Hypothesis
3b

Conscientiousness will predict security risk behaviors, such
that individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in more
security risk behaviors than individuals high in
conscientiousness.
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Table 2, continued. Research Question and Hypothesized Relationships
Hypothesis 4a

Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security
damaging behaviors.

Conscientiousness will predict security damaging behaviors,
such that individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in
Hypothesis 4b
more security damaging behaviors than individuals high in
conscientiousness.
Hypothesis 4c
Security
Damaging
Behaviors

Agreeableness will be negatively related to security damaging
behaviors.

Agreeableness will predict security damaging behaviors, such
that individuals low in agreeableness will engage in more
Hypothesis 4d
security damaging behaviors than individuals high in
agreeableness.
Hypothesis 4e

Emotional Stability will be negatively related to security
damaging behaviors.

Emotional Stability will predict security damaging behaviors,
such that individuals low in emotional stability will engage in
Hypothesis 4f
more security damaging behaviors than individuals high in
emotional stability.
Hypothesis 5a

Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors
will be positively related to security assurance behaviors.

Organizational
Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors
Hypothesis 5b
Citizenship
will be positively related to security compliance behaviors.
Behaviors
Security assurance and security compliance behaviors will be
Hypothesis 5c more strongly related to organizationally directed citizenship
behaviors than interpersonally directed citizenship behaviors.
Hypothesis 6a

Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors
will be positively related to security risk behaviors.

Counterproduc
Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors
Hypothesis 6b
tive Work
will be positively related to security damaging behaviors.
Behaviors
Security risk and security damaging behaviors will be more
Hypothesis 6c strongly related to organizational deviance than interpersonal
deviance.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Cyber-Security Scale Items

Item
SAB1
SAB2
SAB3
SAB4

% Who
Min Max Performed
Behavior
4.20 2.323 1
7
75.3%

Mean
Monitored your work computer for signs of a virus or malware
Immediately deleted suspicious emails in your work email without
reading them
Refused to tell anyone your work ID or password
Used a secure password for your work computer. (i.e. a password
containing a combination of letters, numbers, and symbols)

SD

4.47 2.289

1

7

79.5%

3.77 2.391

1

7

70.2%

5.52 1.943

1

7

93.1%

2.29 1.760

1

7

43.8%

3.96 2.190

1

7

76.1%

6.00 1.649

1

7

95.6%

SCB1

Changed your password more frequently than your employer
requires.
Went above and beyond what is required of you in order to protect
your work information.
Followed the information security policies and practices at work

SCB2

Used the information security technology provided to you at work.

4.90 2.315

1

7

81.8%

SCB3

Used good information security practices at work.
Complied with organizational information security policies to
protect the organization's information systems.
Written your work password on a piece of paper and left it where
others might see it.
Chosen relatively simple passwords for your work computer.
Shared your work account user name or password with a friend or
coworker.
Used your social security number as your password.
Copied work information onto a personal USB drive to do work at
home.
Installed unauthorized software from the internet onto your work
computer without permission from your employer.
Walked away from your computer without locking it first.
Attempted to crack the password on the firewall your company has
set in place to assess prohibited websites while at work.

5.81 1.758

1

7

94.8%

5.17 2.282

1

7

83.9%

1.79 1.482

1

7

28.1%

2.43 1.817

1

7

50.1%

1.64 1.352

1

7

24.3%

1.28

.954

1

7

10.3%

2.12 1.771

1

7

35.1%

1.59 1.241

1

7

23.9%

1.33

.977

1

7

75.3%

1.25

.846

1

7

12.6%

SDB2

Introduced a Trojan horse program into your company’s network.

1.36 1.082

1

7

9.6%

SDB3

Used a file decryption program to discover the contents of a file
containing information you are not authorized to see.

1.33 1.006

1

7

12.6%

SDB4

Used you company email to send spam messages for personal gain.

1.62 1.335

1

7

11.7%

SDB5

Communicated confidential information on an unsecured network.

4.09 2.336

1

7

21.2%

SDB6

Intentionally disclosed confidential company information to
unauthorized sources.

1.27

1

6

11.0%

SAB5
SAB6

SCB4
SRB1
SRB2
SRB3
SRB4
SRB5
SRB6
SRB7
SDB1
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.848

Table 4. Exploratory Factor Analysis Loadings

1
Security Assurance Behaviors
Monitored your work computer for signs of a virus or malware
Changed your password more frequently than your employer
requires.
Went above and beyond what is required of you in order to
protect your work information.
Security Compliance Behaviors
Used a secure password for your work computer. (i.e. a
password containing a combination of letters, numbers, and
symbols)
Followed the information security policies and practices at
work
Used the information security technology provided to you at
work.
Used good information security practices at work.
Complied with organizational information security policies to
protect the organization's information systems.
Security Risk Behaviors
Written your work password on a piece of paper and left it
where others might see it.

Attempted to crack the password on the firewall your company
has set in place to assess prohibited websites while at work.
Introduced a Trojan horse program into your company’s
network.
Used a file decryption program to discover the contents of a
file containing information you are not authorized to see.
Used you company email to send spam messages for personal
gain.
Communicated confidential information on an unsecured
network.
Intentionally disclosed confidential company information to
unauthorized sources.
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3

4
0.486
0.402
0.512

0.679
0.727
0.536
0.738
0.608

0.402

Chosen relatively simple passwords for your work computer.
Shared your work account user name or password with a friend
or coworker.
Walked away from your computer without locking it first.
Security Damaging Behaviors
Used your social security number as your password.
Copied work information onto a personal USB drive to do
work at home.
Installed unauthorized software from the internet onto your
work computer without permission from your employer.

Factors
2

0.668
0.452
0.453
0.895
0.414
0.615

0.845
0.868
0.805
0.814
0.494
0.825

Table 5. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings
Factor and Item

Loading

Security Assurance Behaviors
Monitored your work computer for signs of a virus or malware.
Changed your password more frequently than your employer requires.
Went above and beyond what is required of you in order to protect your
work information.
Security Compliance Behaviors
Used a secure password for your work computer. (i.e. a password
containing a combination of letters, numbers, and symbols)
Followed the information security policies and practices at work.
Used the information security technology provided to you at work.
Used good information security practices at work.
Complied with organizational information security policies to protect the
organization's information systems.
Security Risk Behaviors
Written your work password on a piece of paper and left it where others
might see it.
Chosen relatively simple passwords for your work computer.
Shared your work account user name or password with a friend or
coworker.
Walked away from your computer without locking it first.*
Security Damaging Behaviors
Used your social security number as your password.
Copied work information onto a personal USB drive to do work at home.
Installed unauthorized software from the internet onto your work computer
without permission from your employer.
Attempted to crack the password on the firewall your company has set in
place to assess prohibited websites while at work.
Introduced a Trojan horse program into your company’s network.
Used a file decryption program to discover the contents of a file containing
information you are not authorized to see.
Used you company email to send spam messages for personal gain.
Communicated confidential information on an unsecured network.
Intentionally disclosed confidential company information to unauthorized
sources.
Notes:
removed
fromfrom
finalfinal
scale.scale.
CR = Composite
ReliabilityReliability
Note: *Item
*Item
removed
CR = Composite
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CR
0.63

0.53
0.40
0.66
0.75
0.50
0.71
0.53
0.65
0.63
0.63
0.60
0.46
0.72
0.18
0.89
0.81
0.34
0.59
0.74
0.77
0.68
0.81
0.58
0.77

Table 6. Model Fit Indices
Model Model Description
1
2

Four Factor Model
Four Factor Model
with SRB7 removed

Satorra-Bentler Scaled χ2

df

CFI

TLI

RMSEA (90% CI)

SRMR

346.815**

183 0.86

0.84

.06(.051-.07)

0.07

290.99**

164 0.89

0.87

.057(.046-.068)

0.065

Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI – Tucker-Lewis index of fit; RMSEA = root mean square error of
approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean square residual.
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Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis of Study Variables
M
36.15

SD
11.86

Skewness
.91

Kurtosis
.28

2. Gender

1.53

0.50

-.11

-2.00

3. Education

5.02

1.70

-.27

-.70

25.73

14.35

-.09

-.83

5. Job Tenure (Years)

5.21

4.75

1.90

4.75

6. Job Title (IT/non-IT)

0.07

0.25

3.53

10.52

7. Severity of Punishment

3.73

0.94

-.75

.30

8. Extraversion

2.93

0.82

.14

-.40

9. Agreeableness

3.87

0.64

-.40

-.15

10. Conscientiousness

3.82

0.62

-.32

-.04

11. Emotional Stability

3.30

0.68

-.14

-.42

12. Openness to Experience

3.78

0.61

-.17

-.18

13. OCB-I

3.65

0.67

-.14

.04

14. OCB-O

4.08

0.58

-.56

-.26

15. Interpersonal Deviance

1.47

0.66

2.04

4.22

16. Organizational Deviance

1.64

0.61

1.61

3.03

17. Security Assurance Behaviors

3.48

1.50

.25

-.42

18. Security Compliance Behaviors

5.48

1.39

-.85

.16

19. Security Risk Behaviors

1.95

1.18

1.41

1.49

20. Security Damaging Behaviors

1.46

0.81

2.66

7.28

1. Age

4. Computer Use (Hours)

Note: Job Title is dichotomized
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Table 8. Intercorrelations Among Study Variables
1
-

1. Age
.05
2. Gender
.09
3. Education
.00
4. Computer Use (Hours)
***
5. Job Tenure (Years)
.42
.00
6. Job Title (IT/non-IT)
.00
7. Severity of Punishment
.05
8. Extraversion
9. Agreeableness
.23***
10. Conscientiousness
.23***
***
11. Emotional Stability
.25
.04
12. Openness to Experience
.05
13. OCB-I
14. OCB-O
.27***
15. Interpersonal Deviance
-.22***
16. Organizational Deviance
-.23***
17. Security Assurance Behaviors .09
18. Security Compliance Behaviors .20***
19. Security Risk Behaviors
-.13**
20. Security Damaging Behaviors -.22***

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

(.88)
.01

(.89)

9

10

.00
-.01
.00
-.14**
-.01
.04
***

.29
.19***
**
-.15
.07

**

.14
.02
-.01
-.09
.01
.01

**

.15
**
.16
.07
-.05
.01
-.07
-.04
-.01

.18***
.15**
-.23***
-.16**
-.07
.04
.13**
.00
.00
***
-.04
-.21

.07

-

.16**
-.01
-.04
-.04
.06
.04
.04
.03
.00
.00
.01
.01
.14**
-.03
-.02

Notes: N = 450-477; Job Title is dichotomized; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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.02
-.03
.04
*

.11
.15**
*
.12
-.05
.09
.09
-.05
-.08
.10*
.07
-.01
.00

.00
-.02
-.05
-.03
.06
-.05
-.06
-.05
-.01
-.02
.08
.02
-.04
.02

***

.20
.17***
*
.09
.09
.21***
.29***
-.11*
-.14**
.20***
.19***
-.15**
*
-.12

.30***
.11*
***
.28
.22***
.13**
-.02
.00
-.03
.07
.03
.08
.04

(.87)
.39***
***
.26
.35***
.36***
.42***
-.40***
-.40***
.15**
.29***
-.14**
***
-.29

(.84)
***

.40
.33***
.35***
.48***
-.40***
-.50***
.18***
.27***
-.21***
***
-.32

Table 8 continued. Intercorrelations Among Study Variables
11
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Education
4. Computer Use (Hours)
5. Job Tenure (Years)
6. Job Title (IT/non-IT)
7. Severity of Punishment
8. Extraversion
9. Agreeableness
10. Conscientiousness
(.79)
11. Emotional Stability
12. Openness to Experience
.24***
.08
13. OCB-I
14. OCB-O
.27***
15. Interpersonal Deviance
-.24***
16. Organizational Deviance
-.29***
17. Security Assurance Behaviors .19***
18. Security Compliance Behaviors .21***
19. Security Risk Behaviors
-.18***
20. Security Damaging Behaviors -.11*

12

13

14

15

16

17

(.90)
-.06

(.63)

18

19

20

(.84)
.29***
.29***
-.21***
-.20***
.11*
.27***
-.16***
***
-.21

(.78)
.34***
-.13**
-.22***
.18***
.22***
.00
*

-.12

(.69)
-.56***
-.64***
.15**
.44***
-.40***
***
-.55

Notes: N = 450-477; Job Title is dichotomized; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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(.91)
.83***
.00
***

-.34
.43***
***
.61

***

-.31
.48***
***
.61

.25***
-.02
***

.16

(.75)
-.24*** (.63)
***
***
-.25
.55

(.89)

Table 9. Regression Results: Predicting Security Assurance Behaviors
Model

1: Conscientiousness 2: Agreeableness

3: Openness to
Experience

Step 1: Controls
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
Step 1 R2

.09*
-.07
.00
.20***

.09
-.08
.01
.19***

.10*
-.07
.02
.20***

.06***

.05***

.05***

.06
-.10*
.00
.18***
.15**

.06
-.11*
.02
.16**

.09*
-.08
.02
.19***

Step 2: Direct Effects
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
1. Conscientiousness
2. Agreeableness
3. Openness to
Experience
Total F
Total R2
∆R

2

.14**

7.23***

6.30***

.10*
5.976***

.08**

.07**

.06

0.02

0.02

0.01

Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 10. Regression Results: Predicting Security Compliance Behaviors
Model
Step 1: Controls
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
Step 1 R2
Step 2: Direct Effects
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
1. Conscientiousness
Total F
Total R2
∆ R2

1: Conscientiousness
.21***
.03
.14**
.18***
.10***
.17***
-.01
.13**
.15**
.19***
13.45***
.13
.03***

Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 11. Regression Results: Predicting Security Risk Behaviors
Model
Step 1: Controls
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
Step 1 R2
Step 2: Direct Effects
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
1. Conscientiousness
Total F
Total R2
∆ R2

1: Conscientiousness
-.13**
.01
-.03
-.14**
.04**
-.09
.04
-.02
-.10*
-.18***
6.17***
.06***
0.03

Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 12. Regression Results: Predicting Security Damaging Behaviors
Model
Step 1: Controls
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
Step 1 R2
Step 2: Direct Effects
Age
Gender
Computer Use
Severity of Punishment
1. Conscientiousness
2. Agreeableness
3. Emotional Stability
Total F
Total R2
∆R

2

1: Conscientiousness 2: Agreeableness

3: Openness to
Experience

-.20***
-.19***
-.03
-.11*

-.22***
-.19***
-.01
-.12**

-.21***
-.17***
.00
-.12**

.09***

.10***

.09***

-.15**
-.15**
.00
-.06
-.25***

-.18***
-.13**
-.01
-.08

-.19***
-.18***
.00
-.11*

-.19***
15.56***

13.66***

-.08
9.23***

.15***
0.06

.13***

.09

0.03

0.01

Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Figures

Figure 1. Conceptual relationship between cyber behaviors and organizational citizenship
behaviors.
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Figure 2. Conceptual relationship between cyber behaviors and counterproductive work
behaviors.
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Appendices
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Appendix A: Cyber-Security Behavior Scale
Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the following
behaviors in the past year.
Response Options: 1 = “Never”; 2 = “Once a Year”; 3 = “Twice a Year”; 4 = “Several times a
year”; 5 = “Monthly”; 6 = “Weekly”; 7 = “Daily”
Behavior
Security Assurance

Security Compliance

Security Risk

Items
SAB1 Monitored your work computer for signs of
a virus or malware
SAB2 Immediately deleted suspicious emails in
your work email without reading them
SAB3 Refused to tell anyone your work ID or
password
SAB4 Used a secure password for your work
computer. (i.e. a password containing a
combination of letters, numbers, and
symbols)
SAB5 Changed your password more frequently
than your employer requires.
SAB6 Went above and beyond what is required of
you in order to protect your work
information.
SCB1 Followed the information security policies
and practices at work
SCB2 Used the information security technology
provided to you at work.
SCB3 Used good information security practices at
work.
SCB4 Complied with organizational information
security policies to protect the organization's
information systems.
SRB1 Written your work password on a piece of
paper and left it where others might see it.
SRB2 Chosen relatively simple passwords for your
work computer.
SRB3 Shared your work account user name or
password with a friend or coworker.
SRB4 Used your social security number as your
password.
SRB5 Copied work information onto a personal
USB drive to do work at home.
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Source
Stanton et al
(2005)
Yoon et al
(2012)
Yoon et al
(2012)
Stanton et al
(2005)

Self-Developed
Self-Developed

Hu et al. (2012)
Hu et al. (2012)
Hu et al. (2012)
Herath & Rao
(2009)
Stanton et al
(2005)
Stanton et al
(2005)
Stanton et al
(2005)
Stanton et al
(2005)
Guo et al
(2011)

Security Damaging

SRB6 Installed unauthorized software from the
internet onto your work computer without
permission from your employer.
SRB7 Walked away from your computer without
locking it first.
SDB1 Attempted to crack the password on the
firewall your company has set in place to
assess prohibited websites while at work.
SDB2 Introduced a Trojan horse program into your
company’s network.
SDB3 Used a file decryption program to discover
the contents of a file containing information
you are not authorized to see.
SDB4 Used you company email to send spam
messages for personal gain.
SDB5 Communicated confidential information on
an unsecured network.
SDB6 Intentionally disclosed confidential
company information to unauthorized
sources.
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Guo et al
(2011)
Self-Developed
Self-Developed

Stanton et al
(2005)
Stanton et al
(2005)
Stanton et al
(2005)
Self-Developed
Self-Developed

Appendix B: Big Five Personality Scales
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as
you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same
age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in
absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then select an option on the scale.
Response Options: 1 = “Very Inaccurate”; 2 = “Moderately Inaccurate”; 3 = “Neither Inaccurate
nor Accurate”; 4 = “Moderately Accurate”; 5 = “Very Accurate”
Neuroticism
1. Am often down in the dumps.
2. Dislike myself
3. Often feel blue
4. Have frequent mood swings.
5. Panic easily.
6. Am filled with doubts about things.
7. Feel threatened easily.
8. Get stressed out easily.
9. Fear for the worst.
10. Worry about things.
11. Seldom feel blue.
12. Feel comfortable with myself.
13. Rarely get irritated.
14. Am not easily bothered by things.
15. Am very pleased with myself.
16. Am relaxed most of the time.
17. Seldom get mad.
18. Am not easily frustrated.
19. Remain calm under pressure.
20. Rarely lose my composure.
Extraversion
1. Feel comfortable around people.
2. Make friends easily.
3. Am skilled in handling social situations.
4. Am the life of the party.
5. Know how to captivate people.
6. Start conversations.
7. Warm up quickly to others.
8. Talk to a lot of different people at parties.
9. Don't mind being the center of attention.
10. Cheer people up.
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11. Have little to say.
12. Keep in the background.
13. Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull.
14. Don't like to draw attention to myself.
15. Don't talk a lot.
16. Avoid contacts with others.
17. Am hard to get to know.
18. Retreat from others.
19. Find it difficult to approach others.
20. Keep others at a distance.
Openness to Experience
1. Believe in the importance of art.
2. Have a vivid imagination.
3. Tend to vote for liberal political candidates.
4. Carry the conversation to a higher level.
5. Enjoy hearing new ideas.
6. Enjoy thinking about things.
7. Can say things beautifully.
8. Enjoy wild flights of fantasy.
9. Get excited by new ideas.
10. Have a rich vocabulary.
11. Am not interested in abstract ideas.
12. Do not like art.
13. Avoid philosophical discussions.
14. Do not enjoy going to art museums.
15. Tend to vote for conservative political candidates.
16. Do not like poetry.
17. Rarely look for a deeper meaning in things.
18. Believe that too much tax money goes to support artists.
19. Am not interested in theoretical discussions.
20. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
Agreeableness
1. Have a good word for everyone.
2. Believe that others have good intentions.
3. Respect others.
4. Accept people as they are.
5. Make people feel at ease.
6. Am concerned about others.
7. Trust what people say.
8. Sympathize with others' feelings.
9. Am easy to satisfy.
10. Treat all people equally.
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11. Have a sharp tongue.
12. Cut others to pieces.
13. Suspect hidden motives in others.
14. Get back at others.
15. Insult people.
16. Believe that I am better than others.
17. Contradict others.
18. Make demands on others.
19. Hold a grudge.
20. Am out for my own personal gain.
Conscientiousness
1. Am always prepared.
2. Pay attention to details.
3. Get chores done right away.
4. Carry out my plans.
5. Make plans and stick to them.
6. Complete tasks successfully.
7. Do things according to a plan.
8. Am exacting in my work.
9. Finish what I start.
10. Follow through with my plans.
11. Waste my time.
12. Find it difficult to get down to work.
13. Do just enough work to get by.
14. Don't see things through.
15. Shirk my duties.
16. Mess things up.
17. Leave things unfinished.
18. Don't put my mind on the task at hand.
19. Make a mess of things.
20. Need a push to get started.
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Appendix C: Organizational Citizenship Behavior Scales
Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the following
behaviors in the past year.
Response Options: 1 = “Never”; 2 = “Rarely”; 3 = “Sometimes”; 4 = “Most of the Time”; 5 =
“Always”
Interpersonally Directed OCBs
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

I help others who have been absent.
I help others who have heavy workloads.
I assist my supervisor with his/her work when not asked.
I take time to listen to co-workers’ problems and worries.
I go out of my way to help new employees.
I pass along information to co-workers.

Organizationally Directed OCBs
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

My attendance to work is about the norm.
I give advance notice when unable to come to work.
I take underserved work breaks.
I spend a great deal of time with personal phone conversations.
I complain about insignificant things at work.
I adhere to informal rules devised to maintain order.
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Appendix D: Counterproductive Work Behavior Scales
Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the following
behaviors in the past year.
Response Options: 1 = “Never”; 2 = “Rarely”; 3 = “Sometimes”; 4 = “Most of the Time”; 5 =
“Always”
Interpersonally Directed CWBs
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Made fun of someone at work.
Said something hurtful to someone at work.
Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work.
Cursed at someone at work.
Played a mean prank on someone at work.
Acted rudely toward someone at work.
Publicly embarrassed someone at work.

Organizationally Directed OCBs
1. Taken property from work without permission.
2. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working.
3. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business
expenses.
4. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.
5. Come in late to work without permission.
6. Littered your work environment.
7. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions.
8. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked.
9. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.
10. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job.
11. Put little effort into your work.
12. Dragged out work in order to get overtime.
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Appendix E: Severity of Punishment Scale
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements when thinking about
your organization.
Response Options: 1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 2 = “Disagree”; 3 = “Neither Agree nor Disagree”;
4 = “Agree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”
1. The organization disciplines employees who break information security rules
2. My organization terminates employees who repeatedly break security rules
3. If I were caught violating organization information security policies, I would be severely
punished
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Appendix F: Demographics Questions
What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
What is your age in years? _____
Please indicate how long you have held your current job (in years). ______
On average, how many hours do you work per week? __________
How many hours per week do you use a computer at work? _________
What is your job title? ______
Please indicate your highest level of education
 Some high school
 High school diploma/GED
 Some college
 Trade/technical/vocational training
 Associate’s degree
 Bachelor’s degree
 Master’s degree
 Professional degree
 Doctoral degree
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Appendix G: Institutional Review Board Approval Letter
October 20, 2015
Rachel Dreibelbis
Psychology
4202 East Fowler Avenue
PCD4118G
Tampa, FL 33620
RE:
IRB#:
Title:

Exempt Certification
Pro00024125
The Nature of Cyber Security in the Workplace

Dear Ms. Dreibelbis:
On 10/19/2015, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research
meets criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by
45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior,
unless:
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of
the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at
risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing,
employability, or reputation.
Approved Items:
Study Protocol
Informed Consent Document Revised
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this
research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical
principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the
application is closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that
was previously declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new
study prior to initiation
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of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do
not warrant an amendment or new application.
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does
not limit your ability to conduct your research project.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If
you have
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board
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